A tracking ow is a ow between an end user and a Web tracking service. We develop an extensive measurement methodology for quantifying at scale the amount of tracking ows that cross data protection borders, be it national or international, such as the EU28 border within which the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies. Our methodology uses a browser extension to fully render advertising and tracking code, various lists and heuristics to extract well known trackers, passive DNS replication to get all the IP ranges of trackers, and state-of-the art geolocation. We employ our methodology on a dataset from 350 real users of the browser extension over a period of more than four months, and then generalize our results by analyzing billions of web tracking ows from more than 60 million broadband and mobile users from 4 large European ISPs. We show that the majority of tracking ows cross national borders in Europe but, unlike popular belief, are pretty well conned within the larger GDPR jurisdiction. Simple DNS redirection and PoP mirroring can increase national connement while sealing almost all tracking ows within Europe. Last, we show that cross boarder tracking is prevalent even in sensitive and hence protected data categories and groups including health, sexual orientation, minors, and others.
INTRODUCTION
Online advertising, including bahavioral targeting over the Real Time Bidding protocol (RTB) [62] , fuels [26] most of the free services of the web. In its principle, the concept of targeted (or personalized) advertising is benign: products and services oered to consumers that they truly care about. It is in its implementation and actual use when controversies arise. For example, tracking should respect fundamental data protection rights of people, such as their desire to opt-out, and should keep clear from sensitive personal data categories, such as health, political beliefs, religion or sexual orientation. One of the most important changes on how to process and store personal data is the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [5] . GDPR oers protection to European citizens across a wide range of privacy threats, including tracking on sensitive categories such as those mentioned above. Now that Europe's new data protection law is in place (implementation date of the GDPR across the European Union was on May 25, 2018 ; the regulation entered into force on May 24, 2016) , the next challenge becomes implementing it in practice. GDPR has provisions that include steep nes reaching up to 4% of worldwide turnover or 20 million euros, whichever is higher, for any company found in violation. Monitoring the eectiveness of the law, investigating complaints, and prosecuting violators can only be carried out based on sound factual data. The measurement community, therefore, has an important role to play in developing the necessary new methodologies and in collecting data for GDPR related topics and investigations.
A fast growing body of literature already exists around topics such as "What information is leaking while users navigate the web with xed [28-30, 35, 41, 43, 44, 51, 58, 61] or mobile devices?" [42, 52, 53, 60] , "Who is collecting it?" [29, 52, 58] , "How is it being collected?" [27, 47, 57] , "What is its nancial worth?" [48, 49] , "Which are the potential hazards for citizens?" [45] , etc. (see Sect. 8 for more related work). An area, however, that has received relatively small attention has to do with the geographical aspects of tracking, including questions such as: Where is the back end of a tracker?, How far does a tracking ow go?, Which borders does it cross?, What can be done to contain tracking within a certain data protection jurisdiction?
Extracting the geographical footprint of trackers and tracking ows is dicult for a number of reasons: It requires having access to real tracking ows originating from real users and terminating at dynamically bound trackers. The obtained sample needs to be representative, unbiased, and complete in terms of coverage. The obtained measurements need to be precise, especially in terms of geolocation accuracy.
Our contribution: In this paper, we develop a novel measurement methodology for mapping the geographic characteristics of tracking ows at scale. Our methodology is hybrid in nature -it is using fully rendered webpages and executed tracking code to detect tracking ows. For this we use a population of test users from the CrowdFlower platform [4] who have installed our browser extension. With trackers identied, we then look them up in large NetFlow datasets from entire ISPs. Therefore, our browser extension is adding precision, and our lookup step, scale. An important intermediate step has to do with guaranteeing the completeness of the lookup, i.e., that we have identied all the IPs of a tracker, and that we conrm that these IPs are dedicated for tracking. For this we utilize DNS databases (archived passive DNS records, see Sect. 3.3) .
In summary, our methodology manages (i) to double the amount of tracking ows detected compared to previous simpler approaches, (ii) improve their geolocation accuracy, and (iii) monitor the tracking ecosystem continuously for a time period of more than four months capturing any possible temporal variations.
Ourndings: By applying our methodology on data from 350 CrowdFlower users and NetFlow data from 60M ISP subscribers, we show that:
• Most tracking ows, typically around 90%, originating at users within EU28 terminate at tracking servers hosted within EU28. This result contrasts popular belief, as well as recent studies, claiming that most tracking of European citizens is conducted by trackers physically located outside Europe. The discrepancy owes to geolocation accuracy, among other reasons.
• Connement within national borders is much lower: peaking at less than 70% in the best case and becoming single digit for small countries. There exists a correlation between the density level of IT infrastructure of a country, mostly in terms of datacenters, and the connement of tracking ows within its borders.
Subsequently, we turn our attention on what can be done to improve the locality of tracking ows. We consider two mechanisms: DNS redirection and PoP mirroring.
• With a more thoughtful DNS redirection on behalf of the tracking domains administrators, the overall connement percentage can be improved at both, country and continent level, at a minimal nancial cost for the tracking domains.
• Applying PoP mirroring over popular public clouds also improves the connement percentage within the GDPR region, but when applied on top of locality-improving DNS redirection, the improvement at national level is rather marginal for all but a few countries.
Last, we look at sensitive personal data by tracing tracking ows induced by websites involving sensitive categories, such as, ethnicity and sexual orientation.
• We show that despite the threat of steep nes under GDPR, around 3% of the total tracking ows identied, relate to protected data categories.
• The percentage of such ows crossing borders appears to be similar with that for general tracking trac.
BACKGROUND
Before delving into technical details, we outline the current legislative and operational setting that motivate our study, and highlight the challenges we want to overcome.
Why location matters?
As with most things, location matters also with data protection. This may seem counter-intuitive since GDPR only requires that an online service access a European citizen's data to hold it accountable independently of the location of its legal or technical base. Thus a company incorporated in the US with its servers in, for example, Singapore can still get ned if it fails to conform to GDPR requirements while processing data of European citizens. Then why is it important to know whether a tracking ow crosses the EU28 borders? The answer is -investigation & enforcement.
Indeed data protection complaints can be investigated in greater depth when a Data Protection Authorities (DPA) can be granted legal access to the tracking backend. This is far easier done when the tracking end point is within EU28 borders. 1 But what about national borders? These are important for jurisdiction reasons. Although GDPR is the common data protection law of all EU28 countries, its implementation is left to the corresponding national DPAs. The national DPA is responsible for the handling of a complaint of the citizen or legal entity lling the complaint. Therefore, it is important to know how many tracking ows cross national borders and where the tracking servers are physically hosted.
Last but not least, other pieces of legislation exist that may impact on tracking (e.g., security related, protection of minors, data or server logs storage duration etc.), which only have a national scope. For these cases it is also important to know whether a tracking ow stays within national borders. Figure 1 depicts a high level block diagram of the dierent entities involved in targeted advertising over real-time bidding (RTB), one of the main advertising and marketing applications that require tracking end users across dierent publisher websites. 2 For a detailed description of the dierent entities, the reader is referred to [62] . Virtually all the entities depicted in the diagram may be present with advertising and/or tracking code at the publishers website and thus, be rendered by a consumer's browser while visiting the publisher. The execution of such code induces tracking ows between the consumer and the corresponding entity. Of course there are additional ows related to tracking that are exchanged 1 Notice that terminating a tracking ow within Europe does not guaranteed that the personal data of citizens have not own outside the continent. Once collected by a tracker the data can be moved in any place in the world in a variety of means. Having the terminating end-point within Europe, however, is important since it allows a more thorough investigation to access the end-point and verify what data have been collected and where else they have been transmitted. Data can also cross in and out of Europe multiple times while in transit due to IP routing. In the process eavesdroppers can take a look at them. We don't consider such matters since they are subject to dierent laws about telecommunications and surveillance. directly between the entities without going through the end user's device. In this paper, we report only upon the directly visible tracking ows, i.e., those that involve execution of tracking code at the consumer's browser.
Online tracking over RTB

Challenges
Tracing the geographic aspects of tracking ows has received relatively little attention. This is not surprising given the involved technical challenges.
Challenge 1 -Collecting real tracking ows: Existing work has gone mostly into quantifying and cataloging the trackers found present in dierent publisher websites [29, 35, 36, 41, 58] . This is already challenging since identifying tracking code requires full rendering of publisher webpages. In our case things are even more dicult since rendering webpages through automated crawlers is not enough -we need real users, with real credentials and web browsing history, at dierent locations to capture the full spatial aspects of tracking ows. Releasing measurement code to real users is dicult to scale, while passive network logs, e.g., NetFlow [32] or sFlow [55] , are at a much higher level that makes identifying tracking ows dicult, either because there is no payload (NetFlow) or there is partial or encrypted payload (sFlow).
Challenge 2 -Completeness of measurement: If one attempts to combine the precision of full rendering via dedicated measurement code with the scale of passively collected network logs, they will eventually run into issues of completeness such as: Are there any additional tracking domains other than the ones seen by the measurement code? Which are the IPs associated with these domains? Are there any additional IPs associated with these domains that were not returned to the real users?
Challenge 3 -Precision of analysis: Collecting complete measurements is only a rst step. Next, the analysis has to be conducted with care. For our study, accurate IP geolocation is key to deriving reliable results and conclusions. It is well known that infrastructure IPs, such as servers [31, 56] and routers [34, 37, 39, 50] , are prone to imprecise geolocation. It is also important to investigate if the tracking IPs are dedicated to tracking, or are shared with other services and domains. It is also important to identify the time period that a specic IP is associated with a tracking service in order to remove noise from dynamic use of IPs. 
METHODOLOGY
To address Challenge 1, we present in this section the design and implementation of a browser extension for identifying tracking ows triggered by real users' actions and data. We also outline methodologies for improving the completeness and the precision of our measurements, thereby addressing Challenges 2 and 3, respectively.
Our browser extension
To identify as many ad and tracking related domains, and their associated IPs, as possible, requires collecting visits of real users to websites (rst-party request/domain) that embed such services. User state information, such as their browsing history, cookies, exact location, time of visit, etc., impact on the behavior of tracking, e.g., through winning bids and tracking connections opened. Furthermore, using real users' browsers has the additional advantage of capturing the interaction of the user with the elements of the webpage, which itself alone can lead to the launching of additional tracking requests. Finally, it is important to monitor requests from as many geographic locations as possible, which becomes easier when having a real user base across the globe. Many of the above are impossible to achieve using scripted crawlers launched from few measurement locations that do not correspond to usual residential broadband networks and real user behavior.
To address all of the above, we have developed and distributed a browser extension for Google Chrome. The extension is used for a related measurement project about targeted advertising detection. In the process, however, we obtain valuable data for this study as well. Specically, we can identify and monitor all outgoing thirdparty requests, i.e., requests towards domains apart from the one that the user is actually visiting during their normal browsing sessions. For each outgoing third-party request, our extension maps the associated server IP as observed in the corresponding response header. Since we operate in the users' browser, we only focus on the nal server that serves the third-party requests. The browser API does not report on JavaScript or DNS redirections. However, it reports the nal IP that serves a request.
The small number of published reports based on measurements from real users is indicative of the involved diculties related with such studies. To the best of our knowledge, apart from Razaghpanah et al. [52] for mobile apps, this is the rst time that a crowdsourced approach is utilized to report on geographic aspects of tracking using real users' data.
We recruited users from the CrowdFlower platform [4] . We excluded users having ad-blocking extensions installed on their browser, such as, AdBlockPlus, Ghostery, etc. In total, 350 users have installed the browser extension and contributed data to our study in a time window of more than four months, from Sep. 1, 2017 to mid-Jan., 2018. The number of unique visited websites is more than 76K and the total third-party requests logged exceeds 7.1M
Figure 2: The number of 3rd party requests per website based on data collected from real users browsers. "Clean only" (top) depicts the ows related to other activities such as, live chat services, commenting services, etc. "Ad + Tracking only" (middle) depicts the ows related to ad and tracking, and nally "All 3rd party" (bottom) depicts the CDF of all the ows.
over more than 19K third-party domains. For a detailed summary, see Table 1 . The collected dataset includes the user's country, the rst-party visited domain, the third-party contacted URL and the associated IP.
Ethical considerations: As we have previously stated, all the users in this study were recruited from the CrowdFlower platform [4] . All the users were informed in detail about what data we collect and gave their explicit consent before installing the extension. Users could choose at any point to opt-out of the experiment by simply uninstalling the browser extension. This would stop any data transfer to our servers. Regarding already collected data, although we can delete any part of it, it's impossible to identify specic users since we do not store any unique identier on users. For example, we did not keep logs of actual IPs, but only the geolocated regions. We also took additional measures to protect the identity of the user, namely, we only collected domain names instead of full URLs. Thus, we avoided inadvertently collecting the full browsing history of a user, or storing identity information that may appear on URLs. Obviously we refrained from asking or collecting any personally identiable information such as the real name of the users, emails, addresses, etc. All users were compensated through the platform for keeping the browser extension running for an amount of time.
Identifying trackers
In this section we explain our methodology for identifying whether a third-party request is actually a tracking ow or just some other type of service (i.e., voice chat, commenting services, etc.). Currently, the most common solution is to use a block-list. The most popular lists for detecting ad-and tracking-related requests are the "easylist" and the "easyprivacy" [7] list, respectively. The issue with the above two lists is that they are constructed and used for blocking third-party requests from web browser extensions, such as, the AdBlockPlus [1] and Ghostery [9] . By blocking a tracking ow early, they do not allow any additional tracking code to be executed, which in turn may open additional connections and thereby reveal additional tracking requests that do not match any rules or domains in the above two lists. To overcome the above limitation, we rst use the above two lists (easylist and easyprivacy) to classify all the third-party ows that we collect either as tracking or not. This produces a list of tracking ows (LTF) that includes all third-party requests that the two ltering lists identify as ad or tracking related requests and a list of non-tracking ows (NTF). As a second step, we use the list of LTF to classify additional third-party requests. We examine if the referrer eld of the remaining non-tracking ows in the NTF list includes any URL already detected in the LTF list and also if the URL string includes any arguments. Note that argument parsing using the URL is a widely used technique for passing information between tracking domains. If a non-tracking ow satises both requirements we then classify it also as a tracking ow. Note that the execution of additional requests using third-party code (JavaScript) embedded directly into the rst-party context populates the referrer eld of the request with the rst-party URL. Nevertheless, most of this cases are requests towards well known ad networks to initialize the rendering process of the available ad slots within therst-party webpage, such as, googlesyndication.com.
Finally, for the remaining non-tracking ows, we also classify third-party requests as tracking ows when the request URL include arguments and also the URL string include some widely used keywords related to web tracking and advertising, such as, "usermatch", "rtb", "cookiesync", etc. Note that we build the list of keywords empirically. Table 2 presents the third-party requests classication results. Using the two AdBlockPlus lists (easylist, easyprivacy), we manage to classify a total of 2.4M third-party requests as tracking ows (Table 2 -Row 1). In total, we have more than 500K unique URLs towards 1.8K top level domains (TLD). Using our semi-automatic classication (Table 2 -Row 2), we manage to classify an additional 1.9M third-party requests as tracking ows from more than 400K unique URLs and a total of 879 top-level domains.
In Fig. 2 we plot the CDF of the tracking and non-tracking ows that we detect in each website in our dataset. The top (dashed) line depicts the CDF of the non-tracking ows and the middle (dot-dashed) line the tracking ows. Finally, the bottom (solid) line depicts the total of all requests that we observe including both tracking and non-tracking ows from within each website. The main takeaway from Fig. 2 is that on average, most of the third-party requests are ad and tracking related ows. Finally, Fig. 3 lists the top 20 TLDs of the tracking ows that we detect in our dataset. "ABP" denotes the number of tracking ows detected using the AdBlockPlus lists and "SEMI" denotes the ones detected using the semi-automatic classication. We observe that most of the additional tracking ows detected by the semiautomatic methodology involves domains belonging to ad networks, mostly triggered by the (potentially blocked) ad related initial thirdparty request and constituently not detectable by ABP.
Collecting tracker IPs
For each third-party domain, we collect all the associated IPs that were returned to users who successfully established a connection. Real users from all over the world participated in our four-month experiment. In total, we collected 28,939 tracking IPs. More than 97% of them were IPv4.
Furthermore, to address Challenge 2, i.e., to improve completeness of our measurement, we took some additional steps. First, we utilized passive DNS replication (pDNS) [63] , a method that collects DNS data from production networks and stores it in a database for later reference. In this work we rely on Robtex implementation of pDNS [22] . These databases provide info on (i) forward DNS records, i.e., the IPs associated with a given domain as well as the starting and the end of the time period of this association, and, (ii) reverse DNS records, that map an IP for a given time period to the domains that were served by this IP. For the duration of the experiment, we identied only 806 additional IPs (i.e., small 2.78% increase on the number of IPs, mainly IPv4 (60%) that served the tracking domains but could not identify from the logs of the real users. We also annotated the active periods for the pair domain-IP based on the starting and end active time in the database.
Next, we investigate if other services/domains share the same IP. In Fig. 4 , we plot the histogram and the CDF for the number of TLDs served by an identied tracking IP weighted by the number of requests. Around 85% of the requests served by IPs serve only one TLD. This is to be expected as tracking services would like to sustain a good performance and thus, dedicate the IP for this service. Delays may reduce revenue, and if the tracker is involved in RTB, it is important to guarantee a short round trip time with the user, as the bidding time is typically in the order of 100 msec [13] .
In the same gure also shows that the fraction of IPs that serve more than one domain is less than 2%. A closer investigation shows that the other TLDs usually belong to the same organization, and they are tracking related domains as well (e.g., in the case of Google, doubleclick.net and googlesyndication.com). Thus, measuring the ows that involve the identied tracking IPs, for the time period that the pair tracking domain and tracking IP is valid, will give us a good estimation of the tracking ows.
Nevertheless, there are a few IPs (114 in total) -about half of them in the USA and in EU28 (see Fig. 5 ) -that serve a large number of domains -10 or more. A closer investigation showed that these IPs are used for ad related activities, such as, ad exchange points, RTB auctions or cookie-syncing as they serve a large number of domains related to the advertisement and tracking industry.
Geolocating web tracker IPs
To address Challenge 3, we geolocate the ad and tracking related IPs as accurately as possible in order to minimize artifacts that can bias our analysis. It is well reported that commercial geolocation databases are unreliable when it comes to geolocating network infrastructure [31, 34, 37, 39, 50, 56] . This is expected as the commercial interest of these databases is to geolocate the end user accurately -the customers of such databases are enterprises that want to geolocate their visitors/clients. Several existing studies have shown that commercial databases, such as MaxMind [16] , are particularly bad for geolocating web servers [31, 56] . For example, in the case of Google, MaxMind typically geolocates a Google IP to Mountain View, the headquarters of Google and not to the real physical location of the server, which can be at any Google datacenter, at a peering facility (edge point of presence), or even inside an ISP (edge cache) [12, 31, 59 ]. A number of active techniques have been developed for improving the IP geolocation accuracy for the server infrastructures [31] . RIPE has incorporated these techniques in a single publicly available tool called RIPE IPmap [21] . IPmap uses a large global installation of more than 11K active measurement probes, namely RIPE Atlas [20] , to perform active measurements in order to geolocate an IP. The footprint of the RIPE Atlas probes is particularly dense in Europe (more than 5K probes) thus, in Europe the accuracy is expected to be high, especially at country level, which suces for our study. RIPE Atlas has also a large footprint in the US, with more than 1K probes thus, using IPmap we can accurately distinguish if a server is in Europe or in the US. For every IP geolocation request, more than 100 RIPE Atlas probes are assigned to perform active measurements. After the geolocation process is nished, each probe replies with an estimation of the physical location of the target (server in our study) at the city, country, and continent level. We noticed that, across all our measurements, the replies from the involved probes agree on the continent, and also with a majority of above 90% on the country. We also noticed that the disagreement on the country level (less than 10%) occurs around the borders of neighboring countries. For our analysis, we do a majority voting and we keep the most popular estimation. To further evaluate the accuracy of RIPE IPmap, we geolocated the IP ranges of two large content providers, Amazon AWS [2] and Microsoft Azure [17] , that made the location of the servers in these ranges publicly available. Our analysis about the active IPs that replied to our requests showed that RIPE IPmap accurately geolocate the server IPs at both country (99.58%) and continent level (100%) for the above two cloud services. In Table 3 we compare the pair-wise agreement on the country and continent, across geolocation tools, namely, (i) IP-API free geolocation tool [15] , (ii) MaxMind [16] , and (iii) RIPE IPmap [21] , for the tracking IPs we inferred with the browser extension (including the additional IPs we found with forward DNS). The overlap between IP-API and MaxMind is very high, more than 96% on the country level and 99% on the continent level. However, both disagree when compared with the IPmap. About half of the IPs are mapped to a dierent country and approximately a third of the IPs are mapped to a dierent continent. This is an indication that using MaxMind or IP-API would yield incorrect geolocation in our analysis, since one of the end points of all our ows is always a backend infrastructure server.
To further investigate the impact of the MaxMind database as opposed to RIPE IPmap, we concentrate on three large ad + tracking provider, namely, Google Ads+Tracking IPs, Amazon Ads+Tracking IPs 3 and Facebook Ads+Tracking IPs. In Table 4 it is clear that about half of the IPs of these major providers are mis-geolocated to the wrong country, and anywhere between 30%-60% are mis-geolocated to the wrong continent.
QUANTIFYING BORDER CROSSING
In this section, we present our measurement results on the amount of tracking ows crossing dierent national and international borders. All the results of this section are based on measurements obtained with our browser extension and recruited users. Later in Sect. 7, we present corresponding results from four large ISPs with more than 60 million users. Figure 6 shows the percentages of tracking ows exchanged between continents (or geographic regions like EU28). The thickness of the Sankey diagram is proportional to the amount of measurements that we have from each region. We see that most tracking originating at users within EU28 terminates at tracking servers within EU28. The actual percentage is 84.9% as shown in the more detailed Fig. 7(b) . This result contrasts popular belief, as well as recent reports [52] claiming that most tracking of European citizens is conducted by trackers physically located outside Europe. The discrepancy is explained by the dierent IP geolocation methods used (see Sect. 3.4 for details) but also owes to other reasons. For example, in the case of [52] the variations are also due to dierence in the platforms in use (Mobile vs. Desktop in our case) and the variation between the two platforms (mobile apps vs. web browsing), see Sect. 8 for more details. Unlike EU28 that exhibits high connement of tracking ows within the continent, our second larger user base in South America sees most of its tracking ows (95%) leaking out of the continent and into North America (90%). Since we mainly focused on recruiting European users for our study, the other continents shown in the diagram have small user bases and therefore the connements ratios are not easy to read from the diagram. The actual numbers are Africa 2.11% (22) Overall, we see that EU28 and North America host most of the tracking backends, 51% and 40% of all trac ow terminations, respectively. Other countries, with large IT infrastructure/server hosting receive a disproportionally high number of ows compared with the users in our dataset, e.g., Ireland (3.4%), Switzerland (2%), France (6%), Russia (1.5%). 4 
EU28 GDPR jurisdiction
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on tracking of users in EU28, where we have our largest user base (183 users). Figure 7(a) shows the percentage of tracking ows that terminate in dierent continents for users within EU28 under MaxMind geolocation. Figure 7(b) shows the same percentages under RIPE IPmap geolocation, and the dierence in numbers is astonishing. In fact, this single property of the methodology -the method used for IP geolocation can ip the qualitative takeaway of the result. Under MaxMind one concludes that most European tracking ows leak towards North America, whereas under RIPE IPmap, they remain conned within Europe. As explained in Sect. 3.4, RIPE IPmap is way more accurate for the problem at hand and therefore we conclude that most tracking ows aecting European citizens terminate within GDPR's legal jurisdiction. The only sizeable percentage leaking outside Europe is towards North America (10% of European tracking ows). Another 3% goes to neighboring non-EU28 European countries, such as, Switzerland and Russia. 4 Results not shown in the diagram. Figure 8 is a Sankey diagram for the origin-destination of tracking ows originating in EU28 countries, where we have users in our dataset (the thickness of a ow is proportional to the user base in each country on the left column). We observe dierent levels of national connement. The UK leads with the highest connement of 58.4% within its borders. Spain follows with a connement of 33.1%. Smaller counties like Greece, Romania, and Cyprus have lower connements, 6.77%, 5.1%, and 1,16% respectively. From this data, there appears to be a positive correlation between the size of a country and the amount of tracking ows conned within its borders, but there are other important reasons that determine the level of national connement, as we explain in Sect. 5. In Sect. 7, we use large ISP datasets to cover additional central and north European countries for which we have rather few users in the Sankey diagram to further investigate if the number of users can inuence the connement level for such countries.
National jurisdiction
KEEPING TRACKING FLOWS LOCAL
In this section, we look at the eectiveness of dierent methods for improving the localization of tracking ows. We consider two methods to increase localization, namely, (i) DNS redirection, and (ii) mirroring of tracking PoPs.
Apart from its value for privacy, localization can be benecial also for the ad domains, especially those serving targeted ads using the RTB protocol. In RTB delivery delays need to be kept low to improve the performance of real time bidding.
Localization potential using DNS
Our rst investigation involves a simple DNS redirection based on alternative servers that we have observed in our dataset for the same tracking domain. We rst quantify the improvement potential by looking for alternative server locations operate under the same fully qualied domain names (FQDN). Then, we nd the corresponding TLD for each FQDNs and consider the case of redirecting requests for the FQDN to any alternative servers that belong to the same TLD level that can further improve the connement. Table 5 depicts the results of the dierent approaches. Therst row (Default) depicts the base line of the connement percentage at country and continent level for all the tracking ows that we observe in our dataset. In the case of DNS redirections based on FQDN level, we observe an additional connement up to 5.5% and 24.55% at continent and country level, respectively (Table 5 -Row 2, Right column). DNS Redirection has a non-negligible positive contribution to keeping tracking local within GDPR jurisdiction. If applied at TLD, the improvement in our dataset is more than 10%. However, it plays an even higher role in improving connement within national boarders. In this case, the improvement under TLD redirection is an impressive 38%.
Based on our "what-if" analysis, we conclude that, with a more thoughtful (or GDPR friendly) DNS redirection on behalf of the tracking domain administrators, the overall connement can be improved at both country and continent level, with minimal additional nancial cost (that includes additional server and network capacity 
Localization potential using Mirroring
For our second investigation, we turn our attention to PoP mirroring using cloud services and the potential localization that such an optimization can oer. For this hypothetical setup, we collect information from nine major cloud service providers in which we know from our dataset that tracking domains lease servers. These public clouds make their global footprint and, in some cases, the associated IP ranges publicly available in order to: (i) attract new customers by advertising their presence at dierent regions, (ii) improve the operation of current customers by providing an accurate and up-to-date map of IP ranges to physical location, and (iii) to white-list the IP ranges, e.g., to update rewall rules. The major cloud providers we consider in this study are: Amazon AWS [2], Microsoft Azure [17] , IBM Cloud [24] , CloudFlare [23] , Digital Ocean [6], Equinix [8] , Oracle Cloud [18] , Rackspace [19] , and Google Cloud [11] . For each cloud service we collect the physical location of their operational datacenters, at a country level, as advertised in each cloud service website. First, we check if the the connement within the user's region can be further improved if tracking domains that are already hosting their server on these cloud services utilize additional PoPs (PoP Mirroring), i.e., dierent datacenters of the same cloud service provider. Under the "PoP Mirroring" scenario (Table 5 -Row 3), it is evident that PoP mirroring yields good improvement of connement within the GDPR legislation region, but not so great on the national level. Furthermore, we observe that many countries lack large public cloud PoPs, and the improvement in connement is expected to be marginal for these countries. Finally, at Table 5 Row 5, we present the connement percentage and improvement, respectively, by combining DNS redirection at TLD level with PoP Mirroring. The combination yield an additional improvement of 40.52% and 11.2% at the country and continent level, respectively.
Next, we investigate the extreme scenario where all tracking domains can potentially migrate to any cloud PoP from all PoPs that we observe in all nine major cloud services. After examining our results in Table 6 (Right column), we see that countries such as, Denmark (69.85%), Greece (79.25%) and Romania (72.12%) can achieve 96.85%, 79.25% and 72.12% additional connement over the "Default" outgoing tracking ows, respectively. In contrast, using only PoP Mirroring (Table 6 -Right column) the connement improvement is negligible, below 1.3%, for the above three countries.
On the other hand, countries such us Cyprus cannot benet from this scenario since none of the nine cloud services in our study has a presence in the country. Note that if a tracking operator is willing to utilize any datacenter available in a country, then it is possible to achieve complete ow connement at the national level. In all EU28 countries there is at least one datacenter, even in the smallest country. In summary, we observe that there exists a correlation between the density level of IT infrastructure of a country, mostly in terms of datacenters, and the connement of tracking ows within its borders. The connement of tracking ows within national borders can be improved in many cases, either by using DNS or mirroring of tracking PoPs, at a relatively low cost. However, in some small countries with less developed IT infrastructure, the improvement of the connement of tracking ows within national borders may require proportionally high cost or expansion of the footprint of major cloud providers in these countries.
TRACING SENSITIVE TRACKING FLOWS
GDPR [5] denes sensitive personal data as any data "revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership", also "genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation". In this section, we try to nd if tracking ows exist on sensitive data, and if they do, look at their geographic connement.
Methodology
In total, we observe more than 76K rst party domains in our dataset. To identify domains that fall into the sensitive categories we use a multi-stage ltering process involving automated and manual inspection of website content.
As a rst step we use AdWords [10] , an online tagging service provided by Google, to detect the interest topics of the visited domain. Usually we have 5 to 15 interest topics per domain. Next, we use automated look up to detect whether any of the AdWords Figure 9 : The percentage of websites for each sensitive topic that ad + tracking third-party domains where present in our dataset. We observe 127K requests towards sensitive topics, 2.89% of the total tracking ows we observed categories of a specic domain contains any of the 7 sensitive categories dened by GDPR. If a domain topic matched we include it in our analysis. We also manually examine the remaining domains to see if they contained any semantic categories that had a semantic relevance/overlap with GDPR dened sensitive terms. We used multiple people for this and include a domain in our analysis when at least 2 independent examiners agreed that it was relevant to a GDPR sensitive term.
Overall, we inspected 5,698 domains over a period that spans two weeks. We chose to manually inspect the content since most tagging systems do not include sensitive categories. For example a website related to pregnancy falls into the category "Health". Similarly, websites related to pornography, alcohol and gambling will fall into the categories "Men's Interests", "Food & Drinks" and "Games", respectively. Thus, by manually inspecting the website content we can identify websites belonging to sensitive categories with high accuracy. In total we identify 12 sensitive categories (see Fig. 9 ) from 1,067 domains. The total number of tracking ows related to sensitive categories is 127K. Figure 9 depicts the percentage of tracking ows for each sensitive category. The most heavily tracked category is "Health" with 38% of the tracking ows followed by gambling with 22%. Sex related categories, such as, sexual orientation and pregnancy have identical percentage ⇡ 11%, followed by politics and porn at 9% and 7%, respectively. Religion, ethnicity, guns, alcohol, cancer and death are below 3%. Note that in the case of the categories cancer and death, both belong to the category "Health", but we report them separately due to their obvious sensitivity.
Results
In Fig. 10 , we present the destination continent of the tracking ows for each sensitive category. We observe similar trends as with the aggregated results, i.e., most tracking ows are conned within GDPR (EU28 84.9%) but a non-trivial percentage (12.7%) is collected in North America. The categories with the highest leakage out of EU28 are: porn (44%), sexual orientation (36%) and alcohol (33%).
Finally, in Fig. 11 , we plot the connement for each EU28 country, where we observe tracking ows on sensitive category domains. The black numbers (right) depict the total number of sensitive ows for the corresponding country, and the white numbers (left) show the ows that travel outside the country. The trends are similar to the aggregated results thus, countries with a small population and limited IT infrastructure, e.g., Cyprus, Greece, Denmark and Romania seem to experiencing more leakage on sensitive tracking ows.
SCALING UP: A VIEW FROM ISPS
Next, we examine the geographical distribution of tracking ows involving subscribers of various large European ISPs. In particular, we analyze data from four ISPs in three European countries. The analysis of ISP data contributes to our study in multiple ways: (i) the ISP datasets capture the trac of millions of real users, thereby allowing us to scale up our study and validate our previous observations and conclusions drawn from our browser extension users, (ii) they increase the diversity of our study, not only because the studied ISPs operate in dierent countries, but also because their users are residential, mobile, or both, and (iii) they operate in countries where we did not have a large user base in our active experiment, thus, complementing our study. Table 7 provides a brief summary of the prole of the four ISPs.
Prole of ISPs
DE-Broadband:
This is one of the largest ISPs, in terms of both customer base and trac volume in Germany and Europe with more than 15 million broadband residential lines. Since it is dicult Figure 11 : The percentage of tracking ows from sensitive websites that travels outside the users' country using users within EU28 countries. to estimate the number of users that take Internet access from these lines, we refer to the number of broadband households.
DE-Mobile:
This is one of the largest mobile providers, in terms of both customer base and trac volume, in Germany and in Europe with more than 40 million subscribers.
PL: This is one of the largest mobile and broadband ISPs in Poland, both in terms of customers and trac volume, that oers both mobile and broadband services. Overall, it has more than 11 million mobile and broadband users.
HU: This is one of the largest mobile providers in Hungary, that has also a smaller fraction in the broadband market. Overall, this ISP serves more than 6 million users in Hungary, primarily mobile users.
Methodology
To identify the tracking ows from ISP NetFlows, we rely on the list of IPs of tracking services compiled using the browser extension as described in Sect. 3. In addition, we also collected data for the period mid-Jan. to July 2018 using the same methodology. We perform the ISP study using daily snapshot activity, on four days: (i) Wednesday, Nov. GDPR. The data collected in the above time period are not included in the data analysis in Sect. 4. Our daily snapshots consist of 24 hour NetFlow [32] data collected at both network edges, internal (e.g., end-users) as well as external (i.e., peering links). The NetFlow data provides per ow the collection timestamp, exporting router and interface identiers, the layer-4 transport protocol, the source and destination IPs and protocol ports, the IP type of service eld as well as sampled number of packets and bytes. The NetfFlow sampling rate is constant throughout the experiment. For our study, we consider only the router interfaces that carry user trac, i.e., internal network edge routers. All the ISPs perform ingress network ltering (BCP38 and RFC2827 [33] ) against spoong. We noticed that the majority of the ows (more than 99.5%) that involve tracking IPs are Web trac in ports 80 or 443, using either TCP or UDP (due to the increasing usage of QUIC [40, 54] ) protocols. Overall, more than 83% of the trac used port 443, thus, it was encrypted.
Ethical considerations: To protect the privacy of users, the IPs of the end users in the Netow data are anonymized, i.e., replaced with the country code where each ISP operates. We do not collect, store, or process any information regarding the users. For our study, individual user IPs and activity are not important considering we know that the users are located in the country that the ISP operates. To report on the number of ows that involve the tracking IPs, we use a hash function to check if the source or the destination of the ow matches any tracking IP. If it matches, we increase the counter for this tracking IP by one. For our analysis we follow the methodology described in Sect. 4 to infer border crossing.
Results
We now turn our attention to the assessment of the connement of tracking ows within EU GDPR (EU28) and national borders. For a summary of results, we refer to Table 8 . Notice that the sampled tracking ows are in the order of multiple millions, but the estimated number of tracking ows is several orders of magnitude larger. For example, the estimated number of tracking ows for DE-Broadband on April 4, 2018 is more than 1 Trillion ows. This highlights the large number of ows that are dedicated to tracking, which accounts for, in the case of DE-Broadband, around 3% of the total ows in this ISP. It is also worth mentioning that the number of tracking ows in mobile operators, e.g., DE-Mobile, is relatively lower. This happens because Web activity in mobile is lower than in xed, since much of the trac goes over smartphone apps instead of browsers.
Baseline results: Overall, the analysis of the four large European ISPs shows comparable connement ratios as those reported based on browser extension data. Indeed, the analysis of tracking ows observed by 183 users in EU28 countries over a period of four months (see Sect. 4) and the post GDPR period between mid-Jan.-July 2018 showed that around 85% of the tracking ows terminated within EU28 borders. As shown in Table 8 , the connement of tracking ows within EU28 as observed from more than 60 million European users in three EU28 countries for the same period ranges from 76% to 93%, which is in pretty good agreement with the results of Fig. 7(b) derived based on browser extension data. When focusing on the dierence across time, we observe that the connement of tracking ows within EU28 has not changed dramatically in the last six months, and it has been high throughout this period as well as before the EU GDPR implementation date (May 25, 2018). Similar observations apply for June 20, 2018 after the EU GDPR implementation date. This is an indication that many companies in the ad and tracking space took measures to conne tracking ows within EU28 borders according to GDPR law.
The eect of provider type: When comparing the connement across networks, there are some noticeable dierences. The ISPs that are primarily mobile operators, namely DE-Mobile and HU, yield higher connement (above 90%). This is to be expected as mobile users typically rely on the DNS service of their provider, and, thus get mapped to nearby tracking servers more frequently, if available. On the other hand, broadband users increasingly rely on third-party DNS services [46] , e.g., Google DNS, Quad9, Level3, etc., 
The eect of local IT infrastructure: We also assess the extend of which local IT infrastructure deployment plays an important role in increasing the connement of tracking ows within national borders. In Fig. 12 , we show the connement of tracking ows in the top ve countries for the four ISPs on April 4, 2018; similar observations are derived for the other two dates in our dataset. The two ISPs that operate in Germany, a country with very developed IT and networking infrastructure in Europe, have considerably higher connement within national borders, 69% for DE-Broadband and 67.31% for DE-Mobile, compared to 0.25% (not visible in Fig. 12(c) ) and 6.85% for PL and HU, respectively. As expected, a large fraction of tracking ows that cross borders are served by servers in other neighboring EU countries, with a heavy bias on countries with advanced IT infrastructure, such as the Netherlands and Ireland in the case of German operators, Germany and the Netherlands in the case of PL, Austria in the case of HU. This analysis agrees with the analysis of the data collected from the real users using the browser extension (see Sect. 4).
RELATED WORK
A subsequential amount of recent work has studied the privacy implications of online advertising and web tracking in desktop [28-30, 35, 41, 51, 58, 61] , mobile [53, 60] or mixed platforms [36, 42, 52] . In Table 9 , we summarize and compare some of the key features and approaches from this literature. We highlight all positive features of each work with a green checkmark, all negative ones with a red cross, and all neutral ones with a black dot. The rating scheme in use is based on the challenges stated in Sect. 2.3. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the only existing work fully dedicated to the study of cross border tracking on the web. Few other works have touched upon geographic matters of tracking but never at the depth and breadth that we have. Also, in order to carry our study, we had to come up with methodological contributions that progress the aggregate state of the art from previous work along multiple directions (see the right column of Table 9 for an overview).
In regards to reviewing the literature, we focus on four key aspects:
Third-party request classication: One of the most critical and non-trivial problems is to be able to distinguish a third-party request either as ad-or tracking-related or not. Currently, the most common solution is to use the "easylist" and "easyprivacy" [7] lists to detect ad-and tracking-related requests, respectively. A naive usage of the above lists can lead to an over-or under-estimation of the third-party requests belonging to each category depending on how the lists are used. For example, one can consider all the domains included in the list. This approach will lead to an overestimation since domains such as "google.com" can serve all three types of request. Another way of using the lists is by using the included blocking rules and classify the third-party request only when there is an exact match. Note that the lists are constructed to block thirdparty requests as observed from the real users browser, thus, any subsequent third-party requests that is initiated by the blocked content may include additional domains that will stay outside the list rules as explained earlier in Sect. 3.2. The above observations are also identied and reported in [52, 58] and are also conrmed by our own work. We refer to the extra work we do to collect additional trackers that do not appear in the standard lists as "Custom Corrections" in Table 9 .
Data collection: The data collection process (Table 9 -Row 5) can also inuence the results in some cases. The convenience of using web crawling as oppose to real users can limit the number of observable third-party requests due to the lack of user interaction (scroll or page down) on a webpage that includes tracking code. To improve user experience, reduce data consumption, and charge advertisers accurately, ads are rendered only when the ad slot becomes visible to the user. For more discussion about the advantages of using real users in the mobile environment see [42, 52] . Web crawling is a better approach (given that it is faster) for studies that do not require user interaction with the content, e.g., collecting information about mobile apps from app stores [53] or from web-archives [41] . In this work, the data collection takes place on real users' browsers using a browser extension to overcome the above limitation as described in Sect. 3.1.
Infrastructure geolocation: In order to improve the user experience, most web platforms and e-stores use a geolocation service for things like customizing content language or currency based on the location of a visitor. As a result, most geolocation services turn their attention towards the accurate geolocation of end users connecting from residential or mobile broadband networks. Accurately geolocating server infrastructure is a secondary priority for such services. Indeed, by manually examining some of the available geolocation services, we noticed that the location for most of the IPs related to infrastructure servers was determined based on the legal entity owner's location (see Sect 3.4). Thus, using such services to infer server location is problematic. If the focus of a study is to only geolocate the legal entity behind a specic server IP, then these services can be used safely (Table 9 -Row 6) [36, 53] . In this work we identify the above problem and we avoid it by utilizing a state-of-the-art solution based on active measurement to correctly geolocate infrastructure servers involved in web tracking and advertising activities.
Trac type: An additional advantage is to have a methodology that can work on encrypted trac (Table 9 -Row 7). Most ad and tracking related third-party requests that we observe in our study have already moved to encrypted trac (83.14% based on the real users dataset). As we can see in Table 9 , ten out of fourteen studies are able to operate on encrypted trac. In this work we propose a novel methodology that can identify tracking ows in the wild using ISPs NetFlows. In more details, we use active measurement to carefully identify the IPs associated with ad and tracking related activities within real users browsers (see Sect. 3.3) irrespectively of the protocol used (HTTP or HTTPS) and use this information to analyze ISPs NetFlows at the IP level (see Sect. 7.2) avoiding the need of any additional meta-data or contextual information.
